8 August 1961
In the period from 8.8.1961, 8 a.m. to 9.8.1961, 8 a.m., 1,741 refugees are registered at the Marienfelde reception centre in Berlin.
From 10 a.m. to 2.30 p.m., the SED Politburo gathers in East Berlin for its regular Tuesday meeting. The economy of the GDR, it resolves, "has to become independent of West German deliveries by the end of 1961". Moreover, because there is a danger that the NATO could decide on a trade embargo against the GDR if a peace treaty were signed with the GDR, the question of "how to render ineffective the embargo of NATO assisted by the capitalists" should be investigated.
According to "Spiegel" magazine, both the West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Allied secret services are reporting to their governments that there are large movements of troops by road and rail in the GDR; two days later, the BND warns the West German government: measures to stem the flow of refugees are to be expected soon in Berlin (Spiegel 34/66; Zolling/Bahnsen 1967, p. 120).
In his memoirs, the then director of the BND, Reinhard Gehlen, gives his view on the accusations that were still made after 13 August that the BND had not given prior notice of events and failed to warn the government: "In 1961, I already had detailed documentation put together proving beyond a doubt that the Service had indeed fulfilled its responsibility of providing timely notification to the federal government of the time. Numerous reports before 13 August had pointed out the extraordinary escalation of the situation at the border crossings in Berlin. (…)
Many pieces of information showed very clearly that the moment for rigorous measures to stem [the flow of refugees] would not be long in coming. When reliable sources finally reported that Ulbrich had been given free rein by the Soviets to stop the wave of refugees, the only unknown factor was the date. There were prior reports on the imminent hermetic closing-off of the Zone border, particularly in Berlin; the depositing of light material for barricades was also reported.
It was later claimed that the preparation of the heavy materials needed to build the Wall had escaped the notice of the Service’s intelligence units. This claim disregards the fact that the Wall in its solid form did not exist until the end of an operation whose success was, at the start, not certain even to its initiators." (Gehlen 1971, p. 285/86)
Following the meeting of foreign ministers in Paris, the Permanent Council of NATO stresses its determination, as already set out in the declaration of 16 December 1958 and reiterated in the final communiqué of 10 May 1961, "to preserve the freedom of West Berlin and its people".
The American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who announces the willingness of the United States to fly six more divisions to Europe "if the Soviets were to provoke a serious war crisis", asks the members of NATO’s Permanent Council what they are prepared to do to strengthen the alliance. Rusk pushes for the current NATO presence of 22 divisions in Europe to be raised to 30 divisions. He says the US government does not yet intend to transport the six US divisions to Europe.
The West Germans indicate that they are basically prepared to step up their armament efforts; however, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer does not want to announce the resolutions to this effect before 17 September, the day of the parliamentary elections, so as not to frighten off voters with visible preparations for war. Great Britain remains very reserved: the country is in a balance-of-payments crisis, has great economic problems and no money to raise its armaments budget. France also plays its cards close to its chest; the Algeria problem has not yet been solved.
In the evening, French President Charles de Gaulle receives the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The different standpoints on negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin clash sharply with one another. The French president rejects any negotiations with Khrushchev on Berlin; if the Americans wanted to negotiate, he said, then they would have to do it at their own responsibility. De Gaulle’s explanation is as follows: to reach an agreement with Khrushchev, compromises would have to be made. There would either be no result from the negotiations – or certain positions would have to be abandoned. If positions were abandoned, however, the situation in Berlin would become more and more difficult, or possibly even untenable. And if the negotiations went awry and the West were to lose Berlin, then Germany would also be lost and France would be put in a very difficult situation.
