10 November 1989 (Friday)
From the early hours of morning, Western media, particularly radio and television, report incessantly on the sensational events of the night: the breaching of the Wall at the Bornholmer Strasse crossing point and others, and the night-time party of celebration on the Kurfürstendamm in West Berlin.
8.00 a.m.
Because of the massive crowds of people at the Berlin border crossing points, the attempt to restart passport controls from 8 a.m. – as publicly announced during the night – fails. At the same time, throughout the GDR, long queues form in front of the district offices of the Volkspolizei. Contrary to the original intention, visas are stamped on identity cards; a passport is not necessary. The rush on the border crossing points between East and West Germany started shortly after midnight; during the day they are inundated by Trabants.
At the command of Egon Krenz, an "operative leadership group" is formed, made up of leading members of the security apparatuses, the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee apparatus, its purpose being to achieve "control of the complicated security situation under the present conditions in the GDR and [to cope with] the resulting necessity of reacting to every further worsening of the situation quickly and appropriately." One participant later said that closing the border and a deployment of the army had been discussed at the start, but immediately rejected.
News that the Wall has come down reaches Moscow by way of the news agencies and television footage. The Soviet leadership is outraged and demands an explanation from the SED leadership. The Soviet ambassador in East Berlin, Vyascheslav Kochemassov, is not satisfied by Egon Krenz’s claim that everything had been cleared with the Soviet Union. The GDR leadership is asked to explain its actions to Gorbachev by telegraph.
During the morning, Egon Krenz writes a telegram to Mikhail Gorbachev, telling him that the events of the night had been caused by the large crowds. He adds, untruthfully but reassuringly, that control has been restored since 6 a.m..
9.00 a.m.
In the SED Politburo, according to Günter Schabowski, the mood is black. When Egon Krenz asks: "Who got us into this fix?", Schabowski finds the question spiteful. Schabowski later says: "I mean, that is a rhetorical question: only one person caused the trouble, and that was Schabowski. (…) It soon sounded as if I had somehow stolen the paper somewhere and read it out."
But there is no time for long discussions, because the third day of the SED Central Committee meeting starts at 9.00 a.m. At the start of the meeting, there is criticism that the Politburo ministers who had first resigned and were then re-elected were not accepted by the rank-and-file members because of their responsibility for the catastrophic situation, which they had even admitted. Only when, during the course of the meeting, Hans-Joachim Böhme, Hans Chemnitzer, Werner Walde and Inge Lange announce their resignation from the Politburo does this discussion gradually calm down.
Meanwhile, a debate on the causes of the economic crisis breaks out.
During their first visit to the West, GDR citizens are directly confronted with the economic plight of East Germany, which is disclosed for the first time in the SED Central Committee: they wait in long queues in banks and offices to be given their "welcome money" of 100 marks so that they can buy something. The exchange rate of East German marks to West German marks is ten to one; the normal monthly wage in the GDR of 1,000 marks dwindles to the modest sum of 100 marks in the currency exchanges of West Berlin.
At about 10.00 a.m., under the pressure of Soviet demands, Egon Krenz feels compelled to make a statement on the opening of the Wall: "Comrades, I ask for your understanding. I do not know whether a lot of people realise how serious the situation is. The pressure that was put on the Czechoslovakian border until yesterday has been put on our own border since last night. (…) The pressure could not be withstood; a military solution would have been the only one possible. Comrades, let us agree: because of the level-headed conduct of our border soldiers and our comrades from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Security, the matter has been dealt with extremely calmly (…).
After Krenz has spoken, the deputy Stasi chief, Rudi Mittig, and the ex-secretary of the Central Committee, Kurt Hager, read out their prepared speeches: the former on the situation in the GDR as seen by the Ministry of Security, the latter on his responsibility, the breaching of the Wall, and the danger of a counterrevolution.
The discussion that then begins on a SED programme of action leads to a row over the personal responsibility of the Central committee members for the disastrous economic situation. Central Committee members who do not work in the economic field refuse point blank to accept any blame and argue that they have been lied to for years. Karl Kayser, the director of the Municipal Theatre in Leipzig, also speaks in this vein.
Finally, Egon Krenz interrupts the increasingly heated discussion on blame and responsibility to give information on the current situation in the GDR: he says that "panic and chaos" are spreading.
Then the Central Committee members hectically pass the SED programme of action and decide to convene an SED party conference. The meeting is broken off shortly after 1.00 p.m. with the call to go to the scenes of action.
1.00 p.m.
The leadership gives the order to the command of the National People’s Army’s (NVA) land forces to place the 1st Motor Rifle Division [Ger: Motorisierte Schützendivision] (Potsdam) and the Airborne Forces Regiment [Ger: Luftsturmregiment-40] (Lehnitz) – two NVA elite units trained in street fighting and equipped with state-of-the-art military technology – on "increased readiness for combat." The heavy combat equipment of these units – including not only tanks, but artillery as well – is made ready for combat; ammunition is loaded onto trucks. Members of the political and military leadership of the GDR later say this was a wrong implementation of the order and its aims.
Stasi minister Erich Mielke also places all Ministry of Security staff on alert and gives the order: "Owing to the present situation, all members of the Ministry of State Security are to remain in their duty units or at their operative targets until further notice."
Early afternoon
The most uncomfortable situation for the GDR security organs is that at the Brandenburg Gate, where thousands of East and West Berliners are occupying the anti-tank wall. In the early afternoon, the Mayor of Berlin, Walter Momper, and Willy Brandt arrive at the Brandenburg Gate; their attempt to persuade people to come down off the Wall fails – as do the appeals by the West Berlin police to leave the top of the Wall.
Late afternoon
To this day, nothing much is known about the concrete decisions taken in Moscow – but their result was plain to see. In the late afternoon, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze tells the international press that the Soviet Union regards the "events in the GDR as a matter for its new leadership and its people alone, and wishes them every success." He praises the "border and travel regulations" as "correct and clever, a wise decision." His press secretary, Gennadi Gerasimov, calls the introduction of new travel regulations a "sovereign act on the part of the GDR government", saying the decision was taken in Berlin. Gerasimov stresses that the most important thing to preserve stability is that neither the West nor the Soviet Union should interfere. Regarding the Soviet troops in the GDR, he says that they have a very high level of military discipline.
Mikhail Gorbachev later explains in an interview with "Spiegel" magazine that his political motto had been: "Policies have to be adapted to the situation." In verbal messages to Helmut Kohl, Willy Brandt, George Bush, François Mitterand and Margaret Thatcher, Gorbachev asks the leading representatives of West Germany and the Western powers not to allow the situation to destabilise and to work together so that "the events do not take an undesirable course."
4.30 p.m.
On GDR television, Interior Minister Friedrich Dickel reads out an appeal to the people of the GDR from the Council of Ministers. The "dear citizens", it says, could rely on the new travel possibilities being permanent and did not need to "take any hasty decisions," adding that new border crossings were likely be set up in the near future.
Shortly before this, the acting Council of Ministers has decided to set up six additional border crossing points in the inner city of Berlin by November 14: Jannowitzbrücke (11 January, 8.00 a.m.), Eberswalder Strasse (11 November, 8.00 a.m.), Puschkinallee (11 November, 1.00 p.m.), Potsdam Square (12 November, 8.00 a.m.), Wollankstrasse (13 November, 8.00 a.m.), Stubenrauchstrasse (14 November, 8.00 a.m.). Four border crossing points are also to be set up on the Berlin Outer Ring (Aussenring), the border between West Berlin and the district of Potsdam: Glienicker Brücke (10 November, 6 p.m.), Mahlow (10 November, 8.00 a.m., widened for motor vehicles), Falkenseer Chaussee (13 November, 6 p.m.), Teltow (14 November, 8 a.m., Phillipp-Müller-Allee, now Lichterfelder Allee).
5.00 p.m.
At a rally in front of the Rathaus (town hall) in Schöneberg, Walter Momper, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl speak in front of 20,000 to 40,000 people. The West German chancellor, booed mercilessly by supporters of the SPD-Green Senate of West Berlin, emphasises the unity of the nation, but rejects radical slogans and opinions, calling on people to "remain calm and to act wisely." During the rally, Horst Teltschik, an adviser to the chancellor, and Kohl wonder whether Gorbachev’s message is a "request caused by concern" about more spontaneous breaches in the Wall or rather "a hidden warning".
6.00 p.m.
At an SED rally in the Lustgarten park in East Berlin, Egon Krenz promotes the programme of action that the Central Committee has just decided upon, and professes his commitment to the new travel regulations, interpreting them as an expression of the fact that "we are serious about politics of renewal, and that we give our hand to everyone that wants to go with us."
6.00 p.m.
The Glienicker Bridge ("Bridge of Unity") between Potsdam and West Berlin is opened as the first new border crossing point.
After 6.00 p.m.
A briefing takes place in the Soviet embassy in East Berlin. In accordance with the instructions from Moscow, General Snetkov, the top commander of the Soviet troops in East Germany, leaves the soldiers in their barracks: 350,000 men.
8.00 p.m.
What is happening backstage has on this day not yet become public knowledge. The current affairs programmes "Tagesschau" and "Tagesthemen" report on the course of events.
10.00 p.m.
Back in the Federal Chancellery in Bonn, Helmut Kohl phones the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, and US President George Bush to tell them about what is happening and the happy mood in Berlin.
After 10.00 p.m.
On the anti-tank wall at the Brandenburg Gate, however, aggressive tones and shouts of abuse mingle with the mood of celebration in the evening and night hours. Under the glare of the TV spotlights and with increasing alcohol consumption, the calls of "The Wall has to go!" become louder and the attempts to further this aim by means of sledgehammers become more energetic. To the south of the anti-tank wall, towards Potsdam Square, people start chipping away at the Wall and taking off the pipes that lie along the top in a high-spirited mood of demolition. The GDR border soldiers react increasingly nervously.
Far from having any "control over events", the SED leadership keeps NVA units on "increased readiness for combat" during the night of the 10th to the 11th of November as well. Across East Germany, all Ministry of Security staff remain in their offices; they are still "on duty until further notice".
In November, 133,429 GDR citizens manage to flee to the West.
